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The Balance of Power in Asia: A
Challenge for Europe?
Valérie Niquet
1 International relations in Asia, behind the appearance of successful globalisation, are
characterised by being consistently governed by trials of strength and by the principles
of realpolitik―witness the ceaseless build-up of conventional and nuclear arsenals in
the region, especially in China and Japan1. The end of the Cold War and the strategic
empowerment that this has brought about have permitted a more violent expression of
ancient ambitions backed up with new material resources2. This is attested, despite the
dominant discourse on the progress of regionalisation and economic integration, by
the violent anti-Japanese incidents that took place in the major Chinese cities in April
last  year.  The  anxious  statements  by  the  Japanese  Foreign  Minister,  Aso  Taro,
confronted by growing Chinese power, have sharply highlighted the influence and the
destabilising nature of the great power rivalries in the area.
2 Moreover,  these  rivalries  seem  to  be  hardening  under  the  influence  of  a  Chinese
leadership  that  is  ideologically  on  the  defensive,  and  which  seeks  its  traditional
justification in the aggressive assertion of nationalism. China’s hard-line stance is based
on  its  economic  development  and  also  on  its  military  (and,  in  particular,  nuclear)
capacity.  It  does  not  hesitate  to  threaten  Taiwan,  or  even  the  United  States3.  In
response, India and especially Japan are adopting an increasingly tough stance: we are
witnessing a worrying trend. Until the end of the 1980s, Japan sought to establish itself
as  a  soft  power4,  adopting  a  strategy  of  overall  security  based  on  encouraging
regionalisation, democratisation and a controlled use of development aid programmes,
while reducing the military elements of security. But the rising level of threats from
North Korea and China, strongly resented by a nation that had hitherto chosen to see
itself as without enemies, has led Tokyo to renew its interest in acquiring the means for
effective military action. Today in Asia, among those least democratic regimes in the
region, hopes of peaceful progress have faded amid an upward spiral of rising tensions. 
3 In the Western world, and particularly within the countries of the European Union, the
persistence of a framework of classical analysis of international relations in the region
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is  masked by two erroneous conceptions.  The first is  the illusion of identity,  which
encourages students to tack an external model of analysis onto a political and strategic
reality that is completely different. Reality contradicts the post-modern theses of the
“end of history” or the “clash of civilisations”: such theories, in total ignorance of the
regional strategic situation, see a united Confucianist Sino-Japanese world that is in
reality profoundly split.
4 In Asia, as an Indian analyst pointed out recently, citing Nixon and Kissinger, “the road
to peace still depends on a balance of power”, all the more so in that, for the People’s
Republic of China―which, while it is not yet central in terms of power, has become so
in terms of damage potential―the Marxist-Leninist conception of permanent conflict is
still relevant today5.
5 A second false analytical grid is brought about by the fact that the dominant discourse
on  the  progress  of  globalisation  and  integration  is  picked  up  by  the  regional
governments  themselves.  This  discourse enables  them to “hide their  knives behind
their  smiles”  (cao  li  cang  dao)6,  by  conforming  to  the  politically  correct  rules  of
discourse on international relations.
6 In Asia, the progress of economic interdependence, which is undeniable, goes in step
with a strategic withdrawal by some states to the pursuit of strictly national interests.
First  among  these  is  the  People’s  Republic.  At  the  regional  level,  economic
interdependence gathers pace and plans for free trade areas are on the increase, even
though these  projects  are  also  a  field  for  the expression of  power rivalries.  At  the
political  level,  regional  and  sub-regional  forums  for  dialogue  proliferate,  from  the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to ASEAN, ASEAN+1 or ASEAN+3, by way of the Shanghai
Co-operation Organisation (SCO), the Boao Forum for Asia, the SAARC, the six-sided
dialogue on North Korea―
7 which some would have liked to perpetuate as  a  forum for dialogue on security in
Northeast Asia―APEC, ASEM or the new “East Asian Summit” (whose first meeting, last
December in  Kuala  Lumpur,  served mainly  to  emphasise  its  limitations).  So  we are
witnessing an institutional increase in bilateral, multilateral, regional, extra regional
structures, “track 1” (official dialogue) or “track 2” (semi official dialogue). One of the
main characteristics of such structures is their ineffectiveness in periods of crisis, as
was evident following the tsunami in December 2004 and the Pakistan earthquake in
the autumn of 2005. In reality, this proliferation of structures only demonstrates how
implacable  rivalries  persist  behind  the  appearances  of  multilateralism.  Each  power
attempts to control the regional dialogue. 
8 Even though the discourse on integration is the only one allowed among international
authorities  for  anyone  aiming  to  appear  responsible,  this  theme  has  become  an
important subject for reflection in China, where it is in step with an older discourse, an
older concern, about “the end of the old Cold War model for big power relationships”.
This  reflection  comes  within the  scope  of  the  debates  that  have  arisen  over  the
concepts of “peaceful emergence” (heping jueqi) or “peaceful development” (heping
fazhan)7.
9 Taken together, these elements of the discourse on China’s peaceful emergence and the
progress  towards  regional  integration  are  designed  to  recreate  an  Asian  sphere  of
influence  focused  on China,  one  that  excludes  all  outside  interference,  particularly
from  the  United  States.  Because  of  this,  and  official  statements  notwithstanding,
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interdependence is in reality perceived by the Chinese government as a weakness. Still
more worryingly, it seems that, for the new group in power, today’s priority is to assert
the  “interests  of  the  country”  which,  it  is  supposed,  are  insufficiently  taken  into
account by foreign powers. Particular targets of this new political orientation are the
European Union (on the question of lifting the embargo on arms sales) and Japan’s
more assertive ambitions on the international scene.
10 In a similar vein, China makes much of its support for theories about the emergence of
new “multilateral” risks (various forms of trafficking, public health, the environment,
natural disasters and even terrorism). The main purpose of all this is to help conceal
the  traditional  rivalries,  and  to  nurture  the  consensual  discourse  expounded  in
numerous forums8.
A sphere of competition
11 The consensual discourse is based on the lowest common denominator, the search for a
“stable and peaceful environment favourable to economic development”. But behind
this  façade,  rivalries  are  intensifying:  they  govern  the  whole  sphere  of  foreign
relations, not only within the region but also between the region and the outside world.
12 Several types of conflict are to be found in the area, some old, some new. They tend to
feed off each other. Listed as “couples in conflict” are India and China, China and Japan,
Japan and Russia, but also Russia and China, India and Pakistan, China and Vietnam,
Japan and North Korea, China and South Korea and, of course, China and the United
States, and even, to some extent, China and North Korea9. Add to those the “domestic”
conflicts such as the question of Taiwan or the dispute between the two Koreas which,
inherited from a past age, are part of today’s power politics, acquiring a new logic that
goes beyond that of the Cold War disputes. We are faced, then, by a tangle of different
conflicts all of which, nevertheless, if we evaluate them according to their permanent
character, and not according to their present degree of tension, revolve in the main
around the pole of the People’s Republic.
13 In  this  context,  there  are  two  disputing  couples  that  dominate  the  Asian  strategic
landscape, which respond to an autonomous logic, but which also structure the balance
of power at the regional level and even beyond. We are referring to the Sino-Indian
conflict on the one hand and the Sino-Japanese conflict on the other. While relations
between China and India are going through a warmer phase, for reasons of strategic
priority  determined by China,  those between China and Japan are  going through a
worrying phase  of  increasing tension,  which is  attested by  the  growing number  of
incidents10.
14 The  rivalry  between  China  and  Japan  is  based  on  the  radical  opposition  of  two
conceptions of returning to “normality”―conceptions that are mutually exclusive. The
first is  Japan’s ambition to play a political  role,  even in matters of security,  on the
international scene. To China, this is unacceptable because it challenges a world order
favourable to Peking’s interests,  one based on the legitimacy and the superiority of
China’s  political  power  set  against  Japan’s  economic  power.  Tokyo’s  candidacy  for
permanent membership of the Security Council is invariably rejected by China because
of the immediate effect on the balance of power and still more on the appearance of
power in Asia11.
15 The assertion of China’s power, its capacity to block the emergence of rival powers, are
part of the process of legitimising the Chinese political system. The assertion of Chinese
power abroad is designed to demonstrate the power of the government at home. The
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Chinese Communist Party’s self-assigned mission is to defend China’s power, the last
refuge of its legitimacy and its only remaining means of setting itself apart from those
regimes denounced as corrupt and weak during the last years of the Empire and from
the Nationalist Republic12. Unlike its predecessors, the Communist Party claims to re-
establish Chinese power in all its glory and to prevent any outside interference13.
16 Because  of  this,  as  China  develops,  a  system  of  international  relations  particularly
prone to crises and founded on power politics has been established in Asia. For its part,
Tokyo is  anxious about the emergence of  a  Chinese power for which the return to
normality would be a return to a world order of the past, founded on Asia’s acceptance
of China as the region’s legitimate centre.  A Chinese power that sets up Japan as a
scapegoat for the government’s shortcomings and frustrations. These rivalries between
regional  powers  entail  three  concrete  results:  they  raise  the  need  to  strengthen
military capacity; they draw outside powers into regional quarrels; and they call for
diplomatic efforts to build up alliances and counter-alliances. 
Three consequencesDeveloping military capacity
17 For China, the development of military strength could become at least as urgent an
objective as economic growth, in a return to the classical theory of fu guo qiang bing
(rich country, powerful army) propounded by the jurists14.
18 In fact, China today is actively developing the elements of military strength. Its nuclear
and ballistic capacities have been steadily built up since the end of the Cold War despite
the disappearance of threats against China, even though on a world-wide basis―and
particularly when compared with the United States―China’s strength in conventional
terms remains limited.
19 Japan is also building up, within the limits imposed by its constitution, its defensive
capacity, including that of “deterrence by denial”; the Ballistic Missile Defence project
(BMD) is designed as much to counter Chinese missiles as North Korean ones. At the
same time, the new National Defence Programme Outline published in December 2004
by the Defence Agency mentions for the first time the People’s Republic of China as a
direct  threat  “to  follow carefully”,  and no longer  as  a  potential  or  indirect  threat,
because of China’s strengthening of its nuclear and ballistic capacity as well as its navy
and  air  force15.  More  worrying  for  Peking,  on  February  10th  2005,  Tokyo  and
Washington  published  a  declaration  that  included  among  their  shared  strategic
preoccupations a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.
20 Tokyo is attempting to strengthen its status as a military power. That is the meaning
we must attach to its military deployment in the Indian Ocean alongside the Americans
in  the  context  of  the  war  against  terrorism,  and  again  in  Southeast  Asia  to  its
humanitarian  initiatives  following  the  tsunami16.  Thus,  Japan  is  reacting  to  its
perception of China as increasingly aggressive, and favouring the principle of effective
defence rather than that  of  minimum capacity.  In the same way,  India  justified its
nuclear tests in 1998 by its need to respond to the Chinese threat.
Drawing in outside powers
21 Despite  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  the  recurrent  temptation  to  withdraw  or
disengage, the regional expectations of American military power as a force for stability
have been raised. Japan unceasingly reaffirms how vital are its security accords with
the United States: its firm pledges extend to sending troops to Iraq, despite internal
opposition  and  some  doubts  in  Tokyo  as  to  the  rightness  of  the  strategy.  Peking
constantly denounces this maintenance of alliances inherited from the Cold War.  It
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resents the fact  that the United States is  still  engaged in “its” area,  particularly in
Southeast Asia and taking its stand alongside Taiwan.
22 While the United States is committed to the hilt, the European powers are too, though
to a lesser degree. Their commitment is generally limited to the political sphere, even
though they do now mention the need to nurture a real strategic partnership. The very
idea of dialogue between Europe and Asia can be questioned. The European Union (EU)
or  individual  European  states,  despite  their  hesitations  and  despite  assessments
tending to favour consensus, are required to choose between the emerging power of
China, on the one hand, and China’s “rivals” on the other. This was demonstrated by
the arguments over lifting the embargo against arms sales to China. Such debates are
more  than  just  the  expression  of  American  pressure.  They  also  reflect  strategic
preoccupations,  especially  in  Japan.  Furthermore,  the  question  of  the  embargo
underlined the necessity for a dialogue between the EU and Japan, a country that until
then had discussed security questions exclusively with the United States.
23 Lastly,  the  recent  tensions  raised  between  Tokyo  and  Beijing  in  connection  with
picking Russia as an energy partner show how Moscow can also be drawn into this
problem of choice17.
Regional diplomatic exchanges
24 Rivalries between states are expressed in diplomatic exchanges at the regional level.
These can be carried on through the medium of local people. The partners of Beijing,
Tokyo or New Delhi are drawn willy-nilly into bidding for alliances and counter-
alliances. Sometimes they can profit by them, particularly if the presence of the United
States as ultimate arbiter of the balance of power is maintained.
25 China’s aim is to achieve a regional strategy that will reduce the influence of the United
States in the area. There is some discussion of a new form of “Asian values”, taking up
the notion of  excluding outsiders  from regional  forums,  an idea that  was in vogue
before the 1998 crisis. One such forum was the East Asian Economic Caucus projected
by the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir bin Mohamad. The notion encounters the
same difficulties in practice, being opposed by states that, like Japan, are eager to keep
a strong US commitment to the area. The debate about the membership of the East
Asian Summit, held in December last year in Kuala Lumpur and including Australia,
New Zealand  and  India  but  not  the  United  States,  underlines  these  divergences  of
interest and the lack of any common Asian perspective on security questions.
26 At the strictly regional level, Beijing has to build a network of alliances according to an
assessment of the strategic priorities or, as Mao Zedong would have put it, according to
the principal and secondary contradictions. Thus, India, which is today a secondary
threat, is courted, even though Beijing has not abandoned its favoured partnerships
with Pakistan and Burma, its traditional means of controlling Indian power. Japan, on
the contrary, appears increasingly to be a principal threat, despite the close economic
co-operation between the two countries18. 
27 Delhi, for its part, is attempting to stay close to Tokyo, the Southeast Asian countries
and the United States while conserving close links with Moscow. While it has opened a
strategic dialogue with Beijing in January 2005, and while the Chinese Prime Minister,
Wen Jiabao, did go to India in April to boost trade co-operation between the two Asian
giants,  the  tensions  arising  from  great  power  rivalry  persist.  And  the  limits  to
rapprochement are still defined by Chinese reluctance to see equal partners emerging
in Asia who might come to compete with Beijing’s privileged position, especially within
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the UN Security Council. In what Beijing interprets as preparation for a naval blockade,
Delhi has sent warships to the Pacific, to the South China Sea, to Japan, to Vietnam, to
South  Korea  and  to  the  Philippines,  and  has  taken  part  in  patrolling  the  Malacca
Strait19.  At the same time, despite a proclaimed wish for rapprochement with India,
China is still courting Pakistan, with which a new friendship treaty has been signed. It
includes in particular a significant element of military co-operation: there is a plan
jointly to develop a new training aircraft, another for China to build a new port on the
Indian Ocean,  and a  project  for  Beijing  to  supply  a  second nuclear  reactor  for  the
Chashma power plant20.
28 Similarly, the whole of Southeast Asia is the target area for competing sales campaigns
by Tokyo, Beijing and Delhi, particularly in the economic sphere, making rival bids to
set up multilateral or bilateral free-exchange zones. The attractions for countries in the
region are, in theory, far from negligible, since they offer the possibility of three-sided
deals and some haggling. But these advantages can be exploited only if a presence from
outside, the United States, ensures a sufficiently level playing field in the area. Only the
United States is today perceived as powerful enough to prevent China assuming too
great a dominance or exerting too great a pressure over its neighbours.
29 In an area of vital importance by reason of its economic influence, relations between
states are governed by principles that may appear, especially in Europe, obsolete and
extremely destabilising. Asia, being entirely given over to its regional power struggles,
lies mainly outside the European sphere of influence. This is because Europe, unlike the
United States, cannot offer any immediate guarantee of security or balance based on
military power.  Europe’s  position might prove to be particularly uncomfortable.  Its
responsibilities in Asia are still far more limited than those of the United States, whose
presence in the region is not seriously contested. Yet it is obliged to make choices, even
though the way the EU works makes it difficult for the Europeans to form a common
strategy21. In an area dominated by power struggles, only a real military power could be
in a position to play a role going beyond words or the mere pursuit of economic co-
operation. But a new role would require new acceptance. Europe must appreciate the
gap that  exists,  in  terms of  strategic  development,  between its  own post-Cold  War
stance and the situation in Asia, where Cold War analytical criteria are still relevant.
30 Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
NOTES
1. Since the end of the Cold War, China’s defence budget has increased by an average of
10% a year in real terms. Three new powers have crossed the military nuclear threshold
(India, Pakistan and probably North Korea).
2. One of the functions of the concept of “war against terrorism” is to reconsider the
Asian strategic theatre as a focus of global security.
3. On this subject, see recent statements by Chinese General Zhu Chenghu. He warned
that a conventional attack on Chinese interests could provoke a nuclear response from
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Peking (The Guardian, Peking, July 16th 2005)―a comment that exposed him only to a
belated and very minor punishment. 
4. The elements of “soft power” have not disappeared, particularly in the economic and
cultural fields. On this subject, see Joseph S Nye, “Japan’s Soft Power, Its Limits and
Potential”, Gaiko Forum, June 2004.
5. “Despite differences of scale, it would be probably less misleading to view the
Chinese government’s strategies of openness and economic reform as a prolonged
super-NEP, rather than as a gradual political evolution”. Subhash Kapila, India’s New
Government and its China Policy Challenge, Indo-Asian News Service, October 13th 2004.
6. This idea exists in another version: kou mi fu jian (WWWW, honey on the lips, sword
in the belly), Sanshiliu ji jieshuo,(Commentaries on the 38 stratagems), Jinshen
chubanshe, Beijing, 1995.
7. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has published on the Internet all
the contributions to the conference entitled “China’s Peaceful Rise?”, which was held in
Washington in September 2004.
8. H.C. Stackpole, “Prospects for Security in the Asia Pacific Region 2000-2010”, in Satu
P Limaye, Yasuhiro Matsuda (eds.), Domestic Determinants and Security Policy Making in
East Asia, NIDS, Tokyo, November 2000.
9. In the case of China and South Korea, we may cite the question of the Koguryo
heritage. When it comes to North Korea, we could point to the episode of the Sinuiju
special economic zone.
10. Denny Roy, “Sources and limits of Sino-Japanese tensions”, Survival, summer 2005.
11. China’s attitude is positive in the case of Germany, and more ambiguous towards
India. On Japanese claims to “normality”, see “Japan’s SDF Witness 50 years of Change”,
People’s Daily Online, July 30th 2004.
12. All the more so since corruption is, according to Chinese leaders themselves, one of
the main problems that the government has to tackle. 
13. Liu Jie, Chugoku jin no Rekishikan (The point of view of the Chinese on history), 
Bungeisha, Tokyo, 1999.
14. A theory developed under the Qin dynasty, which unified the empire in 221 BC. The
theory was taken over by Japan in the Meiji era and then re-imported to China, without
much success, by the late nineteenth century reformers.
15. Japan Times, December 12th 2004.
16. A deployment that was in strong contrast to the feeble show put on by the Chinese.
17. Russia has been particularly involved in the rivalry between Tokyo and Beijing over
the route, still not settled, of the future pipe-line designed to connect the Siberian
oilfields with a) China first, or b) the Pacific coast open to the ocean and to Japan.
18. As in the case of Taiwan, mutual interests at the economic level cannot mask the
continuance of implacable strategic rivalries that, at the last resort, take precedence. 
19. Indo-Asian News Service, October 13th 2004.
20. Chinadaily.com.cn, April 6th 2005.
21. Michael Yahuda, “Europe and America in Asia: Different Beds, Same Dreams”,
George Washington University, Sigur Center Asia Paper No. 18, 2004.
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RÉSUMÉS
International  relations  in  Asia,  behind a  façade  of  regional  integration,  remain  governed by
pragmatism and power politics. So the strategic situation in Asia is dominated by a dynamic of
tension, mainly emanating from the Chinese mainspring, leading in turn to the strengthening of
military  capacity  and  posing  some  difficult  choices  for  governments  across  the  region  and
elsewhere. This lack of progress, despite the disruptions that followed the end of the Cold War,
poses a real challenge to Europe which, on the contrary, is intent upon reshaping itself according
to completely different principles.
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